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roland végső

Faulkner in the Fifties:
The Making of the Faulkner Canon

A

s many commentators of the period noted, one

of the most significant events of early post-war literary culture in
the United States was William Faulkner’s sudden rise to international
fame. The most extensive investigation of this dramatic revaluation of
cultural status was carried out by Lawrence D. Schwartz in his Creating Faulkner’s Reputation: The Politics of Modern Literary Criticism.1
Schwartz examines in detail the cultural and political processes that led
to Faulkner’s discovery in the 1940s after the primarily negative reception of his works in the 1930s by leftist critics. He argues that Faulkner’s
entry into the canon was dependent on the early Cold War cultural
context which, in terms of available critical discourses, is defined by
him as a liberal consensus between the New Critics and the New York
intellectuals. According to Schwartz, Faulkner emerges as the common
denominator of this consensus—backed by the Rockefeller Foundation
and the State Department.
Still following Schwartz, we have to take into consideration both
the political and the aesthetic aspects of this consensus. Concerning
the political complications, Schwartz writes: “The reconciliation of
conservative New Critics and radical New York intellectuals was one
of the paradoxes of the Cold War” (74). Both of the parties involved
had to reformulate their pre-war politics during the 1940s to meet the
demands of the new situation. The New Critics had to abandon their
anti-modern, regionalist Agrarian conservatism; while the New York
intellectuals had to compromise their leftist radicalism to articulate an
unequivocally anti-Communist liberalism. On the level of aesthetics,
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as a correlative of their politics, the opposition between the two camps
was formulated in terms of the tension between aesthetic formalism
and literature of social commitment. The basis of the compromise is
the consolidation of formal innovation and radical politics. In the postwar context, “literary radicalism” is not progressive political action but
formal innovation.
While Schwartz’s arguments are indispensable for our understanding of Faulkner’s significance for American literature, quite significantly, he only raises the question of Faulkner’s canonization and never
really addresses the complications of the Faulkner canon itself. My
thesis, then, is that the real substance of the critical consensus outlined
by Schwartz is precisely the Faulkner canon, which therefore emerges
as the very condition of Faulkner’s canonization within American literature in the first place. As a first step, by introducing a set of distinctions, Faulkner had to be divided in order to turn his work into a
legitimate reading material, the unity of which could then be posed as
a critical problem. The debate concerning the rift between an early
and a late Faulkner—“the two-Faulkner theory” (Polk 302)—still forms
an integral part of Faulkner studies precisely because it is an unavoidable confrontation with the very conditions of Faulkner’s canonization.
Without the recognition of an irreconcilable conflict between a plurality of Faulkners, there would be no “Faulkner” at all. The question is,
how do we decide to manage this plurality?
A brief survey of the history of Faulkner criticism makes it sufficiently clear that by now we can speak of at least two foundational critical moments. The first, what we could call “the modernist consensus,”
was responsible for Faulkner’s discovery in the late forties. It defined
Faulkner as a major modernist formal innovator and a representative
of the moderate political orientation of the Cold War liberal consensus
(based on the renunciation of all forms of political extremism). As I will
try to show here, this consensus was fully dependent on the category
of the “late phase.” The main objective of the “postmodern consensus,” however, was to maintain Faulkner at the center of the canon by
redefining him as a postmodern rather than a modernist author. The
postmodern turn in Faulkner studies employed two major strategies. It
either rediscovered the major works as postmodern novels avant la lettre
or tried to identify in Faulkner a tendency towards a nascent postmodernism, most often in the late works.2 We can see that in spite of their
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differences, the category of the late phase remained an essential critical
tool for both generations.
Let me recall here that it appears to be a well-known fact among
the international literati that not all of Faulkner’s works are really
“that great.” The vexing presence of this “other Faulkner” has been a
nuisance for Faulkner criticism from the very beginning. For example,
Michael Millgate, assessing the critical heritage at a historical juncture,
comments:
Bleikasten . . . speaks of the international Faulkner canon as
currently comprised of The Sound and the Fury, As I Lay Dying,
Sanctuary, Light in August, Absalom, Absalom!, and The Wild
Palms. The American Faulkner canon, I suspect, would add Go
Down, Moses certainly and The Hamlet probably, hesitate over
Sanctuary, and make the serious mistake of relegating The Wild
Palms to the minors. (William Faulkner 39)
Both of the most important principles of Faulkner’s canonization are
clearly legible here: on the one hand, there is the basic separation of
high art from lower achievements; on the other hand, a certain periodization is also at work. All of the works named by Millgate are from
the period 1929–1942. That is, the products of Faulkner’s last decade
are excluded from both of these canons. At the same time, within this
major period, as the cases of Sanctuary and Wild Palms show, there exists
an opposition of modernist masterpieces and works of more popular
appeal. While the international canon is seemingly more willing to
consider the lesser works as great literature, even in this case it is the
periodization of Faulkner’s oeuvre that provides the primary terrain
within which the great works should be separated from the weak ones.
For example, when James E. Carothers warns us that “however long or
short one reckons the late period to have been, what does seem clear
is that it can’t, or shouldn’t, be treated as monolithic, generalized into
a consistency it does not in fact possesses” (273), he calls attention to
the primacy of the periodization over the aesthetic value judgments,
since the latter by definition cannot be applied to the excluded period.
By today’s standards, of course, the boundaries separating high art from
popular culture are much more problematic than they appeared to be in
the fifties, so for us it is the persistence of the periodization that should
be posed as the critical problem.
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From a historical perspective, the separate emergence of these the
two different principles of canonization can be discussed in quite precise terms. While the tension between high art and popular culture was
already an integral part of Faulkner criticism in the 1930s, the issue
of periodization is primarily a fifties phenomenon. In an attempt to
complicate the accepted narratives of Faulkner’s early literary reputation (as, for example, represented by Schwartz), D. Matthew Ramsey
argues for the significance of Sanctuary in establishing Faulkner as a
great American novelist:
Contemporary evidence, then, indicates that the reputation
of both Faulkner and Sanctuary were, in 1931, much more
nuanced than the usual narrative of Faulkner’s literary career
and that the gap between American literature and its public
readership was very much on the minds of Faulkner’s contemporaries. Could a bestseller of such “disrepute” also be great
American literature? Critics of the time thought so, though
this understanding of the novel is largely forgotten. (13)
In other words, Faulkner’s discovery in the mid-1940s was preceded by
an earlier attempt at canonization that aimed to unite the popular and
the artistic. The failure of this attempt to establish a comprehensive
critical consensus, however, is obvious in light of the developments in
Faulkner criticism after WWII. While the tension between low and
high art remained an essential structuring force of criticism, it had to be
complemented by the rhetoric of periodization in order to establish the
general critical consensus concerning Faulkner’s position in the literary
canon. Without this periodized canon, Faulkner could not have become
the unequivocal center of American literature. As a matter of fact, the
invention of the Faulkner canon in the late forties served precisely the
purpose of deleting the terms of this earlier canonization. In the fifties,
Faulkner had to be construed as high art and not as popular literature.
Since until the late thirties Faulkner’s reception was primarily restricted to reviews of the latest works, due to the very nature of
the review essay, critics tended to concentrate on individual works.3
Therefore, the issue of periodization is for the most part absent in their
responses. It is true that these reviewers identified differences between
the already published works, but their conclusive judgments tended
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to look to the future, anticipating the fate of a more or less talented
young writer, rather than to the past in order to identify separate units
in Faulkner’s still relatively short career. The central issue of this early
criticism was the separation of the true artist from the hack in pursuit
of cheap ideas and mere sensationalism. With the first appearance of
more extensive critical studies like Aubrey Starke’s article in 1934 and
Conrad Aiken’s and George Marion O’Donnell’s now classic articles in
1939, the discussion of Faulkner as a whole has been established. It is
in wake of this invention of “Faulkner as a whole” that the first signs
of periodization appeared in the 1940s. For example, Malcolm Cowley,
in an article published in 1945, spoke of mistakenly “overpraised” early
novels and “unjustly neglected” later works. In other words, the discovery of the unity of the Yoknapatawpha saga initiated a rhetoric of periodization as well. At the same time, the discovery of greatness almost
automatically led to the necessary closure of a period. Quite significantly, the most explicit example of this move also stems from 1945,
when John Miller Maclachlan already speculated that Faulkner’s major
artistic output is already behind him (167). Thus we can see that by the
mid-forties the general outlines of the Faulkner canon were becoming
clearly visible. The most important point, however, is that the discovery of the thematic unity of the Yoknapatawpha saga roughly coincides
with the simultaneous establishment of the “major phase” (Cowley’s
“later novels”) and its end.
Faulkner’s late-modernist “ideological mainstreaming” (Polk 300)
in the fifties was responsible not only for the making of his reputation,
it also meant the creation of a certain kind of Faulkner useful for particular ideological purposes. Nothing is more revealing with regard to
this ideological work than the fact that the making of Faulkner’s reputation coincides with the creation of a Faulkner canon (or the Faulkner
canon as we know it) based on the periodization of his oeuvre. Putting
aside problems of exact dating, this periodization usually divides the
writer’s career into three units which have their corresponding aesthetic values: the years of apprenticeship (the 1920s); the major years
(1929–1936/40/42/46—sometimes divided into smaller units); and the
late Faulkner (1948–1962). As the argument goes, the early Faulkner
was not yet fully in control of his artistic powers, while the late Faulkner
was already past his prime.4 This late period is usually condemned for
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its didactic moralizing, abstract oversimplifications, rhetorical excesses,
and its repetitious nature (which was understood to be the exhaustion
of the author’s imagination). The most striking feature of Faulkner’s
reception in the fifties, however, is that the self-assured praise of the
recently discovered American genius goes hand-in-hand with the deprecation of the recent works: in a certain sense, Faulkner’s canonization
coincides with his exclusion from his own canon, as well as the canon
of American literature. Two important things should be pointed out
in this context: first, the canonization occurs simultaneously with the
periodization of the oeuvre; second, the moment of this canonization
happens to coincide with the end of the “major period” and the beginning of the “late phase.” In other words, the periods of Faulkner’s career
are separated precisely at the moment when the “major period” is simultaneously acknowledged and announced to be over. Although it might
seem somewhat contradictory, we have to consider the possibility that
the creation of the critical category of the inferior late phase is actually the precondition of Faulkner’s modernist canonization rather than
being an obstacle to it or being simply one of its consequences.
Obviously, these complications call attention to the fact that
“Faulkner’s late style,” unlike the early period or the major phase, is
not a retrospective category created in tranquil recollection after the
closure of the oeuvre—it was created while the oeuvre was still in progress. William Van O’Connor, the author of one of the most popular
books on Faulkner in the fifties, illustrates this point perfectly when he
writes: “The Faulkner canon divides into three periods, certain themes,
techniques, and mannerisms being common to all of them” (160). For
O’Connor, writing in 1954, the beginning of the late period is 1940,
the publication of The Hamlet. Discussing the “failure or relative failure” of Requiem for a Nun, he expresses his doubts about Faulkner’s
latest works and wonders “whether another of Faulkner’s works, his socalled magnum opus, will be on the level of some of his earlier work”
(159). What is striking about these judgments is that the last novel Van
O’Connor discusses in his book, Requiem for a Nun, is from 1951, what
we would consider today as the beginning of the late phase. Nevertheless, at the same time as its existence is established, the value of the
whole late phase is also declared.
If we consider the period marked by Cowley’s The Portable Faulkner
(1946) and the monographs published shortly after Faulkner’s death
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(1962)—that is, the period of Faulkner criticism that roughly coincides
with the “late phase” and the final closure of the oeuvre—we find that
the periodized canon, in spite of the factional differences among critics,
is virtually omnipresent.5 Even if critics disagree about the reasons for
the decline of Faulkner’s artistic powers, the existence of the periods
is never questioned. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the periodized
canon emerged during this period as the most important prop of the
critical consensus outlined by Schwartz. The consensual framework
of the critical agreement between the New Critics and the New York
intellectuals appears to have been the tacit agreement that the oeuvre
can and should be periodized on the basis of aesthetic values. In this
sense, it was the formation of the “late phase” that made the consensus possible in the first place. The essence of this consensus was that,
based on the separation of the different periods, the canonization of
the neglected genius needs to make room for contradictory judgments:
Faulkner can be a nihilist and a moralist, a regionalist and a conveyor
of universal values—or, in terms of basic value judgments, great and
terrible at the same time.6 Quite significantly, even Faulkner’s laudatory
early reception was much more willing to articulate frank dissatisfaction with the writer than the kind of institutionalized Faulkner industry that grew up in its wake. Cowley articulates this complication with
acerbic simplicity: “It had better be admitted that almost all his novels
have some obvious weakness in structure” (xxiv). Although most of
Faulkner’s sympathetic readers probably would have tamed the embarrassing implications of this disturbing generalization (some of Faulkner’s
works are faulted but by no means “almost all”), the dissatisfaction formulated here is one of the most persistent themes of Faulkner’s early
reception. We can see why Cowley’s judgment is thus a privileged locale
of the liberal consensus: at its most critical extreme, it presents Faulkner
as the “Genius without a Masterpiece,” but at the same time it gives way
to the compromise that allows different and even contradictory value
judgments to inhabit the same oeuvre.
As is well known, the first major step towards Faulkner’s favorable critical reception was the perception of a mythical, symbolic unity
within the Yoknapatawpha saga, which allowed Faulkner to break out
of the rather restrictive category of an obscure regionalist and attain
the privilege of being the communicator of more universal themes.
The significance of Cowley’s The Portable Faulkner in establishing both
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Faulkner’s position in the canon and the Faulkner canon itself is a
widely recognized fact. Let me recall here the famous statement from
the revised version of the foreword: “I respect the later Faulkner, with
most of his demons exorcised, but the younger possessed and unregenerate author is the one whose works amaze us, as they never ceased
to puzzle and amaze himself” (xxxi). Cowley’s language suggests that
Faulkner himself would testify (through his endless self-amazement) to
the correctness of the formation of the Faulkner canon based on this
simple periodization. But strangely enough, this discontinuity within
the canon is used to establish an organic unity within the oeuvre itself.
In another often quoted passage of the introduction, Cowley celebrated
“the whole interconnected pattern” of the Yoknapatawpha cycle in
the following terms: “There in Oxford, Faulkner performed a labor of
imagination that has not been equaled in our time and a double labor:
first, to invent a Mississippi county that was like a mythical kingdom,
but was complete and living in all its details; second, to make his story
of Yoknapatawpha County stand as a parable or legend of all the Deep
South” (viii). Later he adds: “It is this pattern, and not the printed volumes in which part of it is recorded, that is Faulkner’s real achievement”
(xv, emphasis added). This is indeed a strange celebration of a literary
genius: the works themselves produced by the author are but weak imitations of the idea which is “the real achievement.” The reason why the
pattern had to be emphasized over the works themselves was the need
for unity (something “complete and living”), since Faulkner’s works
contained something disturbing that could not be integrated into a
homogenous pattern, something that disturbed the unity: “As one book
leads into another, Faulkner sometimes falls into inconsistencies of
detail” (98). Although still somewhat cautious, Cowley did try to find
an explanation for this inconsistency: “I should judge that most of them
are afterthoughts rather than oversights” (99). To put it differently, the
formal challenges of the individual works were displaced by Cowley to
the abstract conceptual unity of the oeuvre.
In order to illustrate the dependence of Schwartz’s thesis on this
periodization, I will briefly highlight the moment of periodization in
some of the most influential early pieces of Faulkner criticism. To do so,
I will refer to Michael Millgate’s first book on Faulkner (published in
1961) as he closes his investigations with a brief and rather dismissive
survey of Faulkner criticism. In the concluding chapter of the book,
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Millgate complains about the inadequacies of this criticism in the following terms:
Only recently has it become thoroughly respectable to speak of
William Faulkner as a great novelist, and there are still those
ready to declare that he is, in the accepted sense of the word,
scarcely a novelist at all. From the very first, critical writing
about Faulkner has been sharply divisible into the adulatory
and the dismissive, and the balanced middle view, which perceives in his work a greatness transcending all faults and limitations, has too rarely been heard. (William Faulkner 103)
The opening sentence of the passage calls attention to the troubled canonization that had to proceed by the paradoxical consensus of
the “Genius without a Masterpiece.” Although Faulkner was already
a “respectable” topic for literary criticism, certain critics still moved
within the paradigm that predated his canonization and simply attacked
him for formal inconsistencies. Millgate, on the other hand, advocates
here the reading that made Faulkner’s canonization possible in the first
place: one must read Faulkner simultaneously as a “great novelist” and
as “scarcely a novelist at all.” As the second sentence of the quotation makes clear, the real problem is the absolute separation of the two
extremes of critical positions (uncritical celebration and overhasty dismissal). Millgate’s solution is the “balanced middle view”—the perfect
locale of a liberal consensus—which allows the reader to locate greatness in a sphere that transcends faults and limitations. At the very end
of his book, however, Millgate formulates this consensus in explicitly
formalist terms: “There has been quite enough discussion of his social
and political attitudes, which are not in themselves particularly original
or exciting, and the great need now is for extended and detailed examination of the writing itself, its language, syntax, imagery, and rhythmic
patterns” (113). On the one hand, this program is the direct anticipation of the kind of institutionalization that was most excellently embodied in Cleanth Brooks’ William Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha Country
(1963). On the other hand, it is a direct suspension of value judgments,
since it already takes “greatness” for granted and designates the role of
the critic as the explicator of textual and linguistic complexities.
After dismissing most of the Faulkner criticism of the 1950s as “not
of major importance” (William Faulkner 110), Millgate singles out two
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works worthy of his readers’ attention: Irving Howe’s William Faulkner:
A Critical Study and Olga W. Vickery’s The Novels of William Faulkner.
The reference to these two critics makes it easy to relate Millgate to
the critical consensus between the New York intellectuals and the New
Critics. The symmetry of Millgate’s preferences should not be underestimated. Howe is a socially oriented critic, while Vickery is a formalist. Inasmuch as Millgate articulates an equivalence between the two,
he is formulating the missing “middle way” as the critical consensus
described by Schwartz. In what follows, I will discuss certain aspects of
the two works to show the extent to which both sides of this critical
consensus are dependent on the periodized canonization.
Howe’s book is the most important synthesis of Faulkner’s oeuvre
to come from a New York intellectual. This monograph was first published in 1951 and then revised in 1962. The revised version still does
not contain The Reivers and speaks on a number of occasions of the
necessarily tentative nature of the judgments passed on an oeuvre still
in progress. The first half of the book is a general assessment of Faulkner
based on the social “background” of the writer where Howe singles
out Faulkner’s presentation of African American characters as carrying exemplary value in understanding the author’s moral plight. The
second half of the book is a consideration of Faulkner’s achievement
through readings of the most important novels.
As a preface to his brief dismissal of Requiem for a Nun, Howe comments on the general problems with Faulkner’s recent works (103–4).
He speculates on the failure of Faulkner’s late period by first putting the
progression of the oeuvre within a “historical” framework. Howe’s first
reason for the shortcomings is that, as a part of its natural forward movement, Faulkner’s chronicle reached the present day and, since Faulkner
is essentially a Manichean mind, the blandness of present-day America simply does not provide sufficient raw material for his genius. The
implication is that while in the past (during the thirties) Faulkner was
writing about the past with remarkable success, the present (the fifties)
fails him as a subject matter, so he fails in the present as an artist. That
is to say, not only is the proper material for Faulkner the past, his very
greatness is in the past itself—he is great to the extent that he belongs
to the past. We can recognize here the strange double movement of
canonization I pointed out earlier: Faulkner’s canonization coincides
with his exclusion from his own canon as well as the canon—he is con-
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strued as classic, not as contemporary literature. Indeed, if we consider
the fact that during the thirties Faulkner was dismissed by most critics
and that during the fifties, when his works from the thirties were discovered, his writings were considered to be weak imitations of the major
period, we can see that Faulkner was never really a “contemporary” for
American literature since his contemporary works were always outside
the canon. If we describe this shift in Faulkner’s career as “a turn from a
modernist aesthetic to an aesthetic of engagement” (Dimitri 12), quite
paradoxically, Faulkner emerges as a writer who in the thirties was more
of a writer for the fifties, while in the fifties he was closer to the aesthetic ideal of the thirties.
But Howe’s second reason for Faulkner’s artistic failure is even more
important: it is his canonization itself. The interesting point about this
rather widely accepted thesis is that it reverses the terms of my argument, since it can only imagine the late phase as a consequence rather
than a condition of Faulkner’s canonization:
What makes this problem especially acute for Faulkner is that,
either through the influence of his critics or his growing selfconsciousness as a famous writer, he has felt obliged to become
a semi-official historian for his imaginary world, rather than
the brilliant fantast and grotesque painter that he showed himself to be in his best work. This impulse toward soberly filling in
the nooks and crannies of his saga has led him to return, often
unsuccessfully, to characters from his earlier novels and has
also led him, still more unhappily, to indulge his taste for heady
abstraction and grand pronouncements. Shamefully undervalued in the thirties, when he was making major contributions
to world literature, Faulkner has been treated in the fifties a
little too much like an established institution. As a result, not
enough attention has been paid to the evidence that he has
reached a serious impasse in his career and that the more he
keeps assuring us that man will “endure,” the less assurance his
own work shows. (103–4)
Since Howe explicitly blames Faulkner’s canonization for the decline
of the quality of his later works, he provides a possible explanation for
the reason why the canonization coincides with the beginning of the
late phase. His indictment echoes the most common objections to the

92

Roland Végső

late period: it lacks the power and vitality of the major period due to its
mechanically repetitive nature and the consequent tendency towards
abstractions and “grand pronouncements.” What needs to be further
explained in this passage, however, is the claim that the critical response
to Faulkner in the fifties was purely laudatory: this celebration was only
directed at the works of the thirties. While Faulkner is no doubt treated
as an institution, it is precisely the renunciation of the late style that
ties Howe to the critical consensus of the fifties. Although he appears
to be formulating a critique of recent Faulkner criticism, Howe merely
joins the chorus and paves the way for the kind of response to Faulkner
that he seems to be renouncing (a celebratory formalism that bypasses
value judgments).
The other work singled out by Millgate for critical praise was Olga
Vickery’s The Novels of William Faulkner. Commenting on Vickery,
Millgate writes:
It is not at all an easy book to read, and it is not, in the full
sense, a critical work—Mrs. Vickery passes no judgments on
the books with which she deals—but it offers cogent and
extremely thorough explications of the meaning and thematic
structure of each of the novels in turn. Because the book is
not concerned with value-judgments, it gives almost as much
attention to Faulkner’s “minor” works as to those usually considered major, and such books as Pylon and even Mosquitoes
emerge more interestingly from this detailed treatment than
from the more cursory discussions of earlier critics. (William
Faulkner 111)
It is important to note that Millgate’s next book, The Achievement of
William Faulkner (1963), performs precisely this same move: it becomes
an analysis of the complete oeuvre proceeding from work to work with
rather suppressed value judgments. Consequently, it abandons the belligerent tone of the earlier work, which demanded a confrontation with
Faulkner’s obvious failures and adopts a much more reverent attitude
towards a few of the novels so categorically dismissed in the first book.
In a sense, one can witness here the influence of the suspension of judgment Millgate identifies in Vickery. As we have seen, Millgate’s earlier
book called for a double project: a formalist reading of Faulkner capable
of critiquing the shortcomings of the late period. As opposed to this
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double imperative, Vickery’s book is based on an exclusive adherence
to the first demand (formalist reading) at the expense of the critical
attitude.7
This suspension of judgment, however, is much more problematic
than Millgate would let us know. First of all, it needs to be acknowledged that the whole of Vickery’s project is one single value judgment:
“Faulkner is great.” Granted, Vickery rarely concerns herself with the
kind of explicit evaluations that characterize Millgate’s first book, and
her readings of the “minor works” deliberately go against the grain, but
her general project is still informed by the evaluative framework that
made Faulkner’s canonization possible. One needs only to look at the
table of contents to identify the general structure of the evaluative canonization. The book is composed of three parts that correspond with
Faulkner’s three phases (although Vickery herself does not make this
connection): the first section of the book, which does contain explicit
value judgments, is devoted to the early novels; the second section is
called “The Achievement of Form” and discusses the so-called “major
works,” The Sound and the Fury, As I Lay Dying, Light in August, and
Absalom, Absalom!; the third section is called “The Pursuit of Themes”
and is devoted to the rest of the oeuvre, the lesser novels which also
happen to be primarily the later novels. At best, Vickery transforms
the majority of the value judgments that account for the periodizing
canonization into formal distinctions. Instead of a simple lack of judgment, we have here a universal framework of constantly recreated literary value (the preliminary judgment that Faulkner is great), in which
formalist judgments obscure the problems of the minor works since, if
the grand pattern is predicated upon the complete interdependence of
every single work, the weight of the major works lends gravity to the
minor ones. Nevertheless, this formalist totalization is based on value
judgments on at least two levels: on the one hand, we have the judgment that Faulkner as such represents literary value; on the other hand,
we have the troubled and quite often obscured judgment concerning
the minor works.
But the real significance of Vickery’s “non-judgmental” formalist study is that, through this displacement, it formulates a critique of
Cowley’s canonizing reading of Faulkner. Vickery effectively displaces
the unity of pattern from the unity of Yoknapatawpha onto the unity
of technique and theme (primarily through recurrent formal and struc-
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tural patterns). This shift allows her to bypass Cowley’s comment concerning the structural inadequacies of almost all of Faulkner’s works by
simply claiming that Cowley misses the whole point of Faulkner’s art
(306). The basis of the critical response devoid of value judgments is
precisely the fact that by the late 1950s it was possible to take Faulkner’s
greatness for granted. We witness here an effect of the critical consensus that was responsible for Faulkner’s canonization: greatness finally
overshadows the shortcomings. Or to put it differently, one of the more
important effects of Faulkner’s formalist institutionalization was that,
since his greatness was taken for granted (unlike in the mid-forties
when Cowley had to make a case for reading Faulkner at all), while the
critical apparatus still worked within the same matrix that sanctioned
the canonization, the question of value was replaced by that of form.
Faulkner’s shortcomings were either explained away through references
to the major works or simply dismissed from the critical field. Thus,
between the publication of Cowley’s The Portable Faulkner in 1946 and
Vickery’s book in 1959, an essential step in Faulkner’s canonization
was completed: while Cowley’s thematic unity could only canonize the
Yoknapatawpha novels, formal unity could now legitimize practically
anything written by Faulkner.
At the same time, however, we can also perceive here a very important internal tension of the New Critical canonization. While it is made
possible by the periodized canon, the formalist totalization tends to suspend the problem of the canon by reference to the internal intertextuality of the oeuvre. There is a conflict here between trying to justify
a purely formal reading extended to the whole oeuvre and the continuous maintenance of the periodized canon which made Faulkner’s
reputation possible in the first place. As we have seen in Cowley’s case,
this intertextuality is simultaneously the guarantee of the unity of the
Yoknapatawpha saga and the hotbed of structural failure since it leads
to inconsistencies. But when Vickery displaces the unity of the oeuvre
from the unity of theme to the unity of recurrent formal patterns, it
becomes apparent that there is no longer any need to exclude anything from this unity. It is enough to relegate these works to a secondary status. We have also seen, however, that while Vickery is capable
of suspending judgment and providing a reading of the whole oeuvre,
her reading is still implicitly informed by the periodization it claims to
move beyond. More recently, the issue was addressed by Millgate in the
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following terms: “But Faulkner’s deliberate use of recurrent characters,
locations, and situations seems a way of insisting that in reading any one
of his novels we take consciously into account, first, a set of specifically
linked novels and stories and, secondly—at any rate potentially—the
entire corpus of his published works” (Faulkner’s Place 67). As it turns
out, formalist totalization is not simply a matter of philological honesty,
but a structural necessity. When one reads Faulkner, one must read the
whole of Faulkner, a “whole” that, according to New Critics, was also an
“organic unity.” Hence the irresolvable internal contradiction of early
Faulkner criticism: with its concept of unity, it was working against the
very condition of Faulkner’s canonization which was precisely the critical perception of the lack of unity. In other words, the internal contradiction of New Critical readings is that they have to cover over the very
condition of Faulkner’s canonization, since they work with the concept
of an “organic unity” that they cannot fully formalize.
The making of Faulkner’s modernist reputation thus proceeds
through three major steps. First, we have a general condemnation of
Faulkner that, in spite of the factional differences, is grounded in the
assumption that the name “Faulkner” designates a unified entity which
as such is relegated to the level of a second-class writer. By the mid-forties, however—and this is the crucial second step, based primarily on
Cowley’s reading—the rhetoric of Faulkner criticism breaks with the
concept of a unified corpus. The New Critical impetus is based on an
almost paradoxical recasting of the meaning of the name “Faulkner”: on
the thematic level, the “mythical unity” of the oeuvre (the Yoknapatawpha saga) guarantees artistic merit, while on the textual level, the
disunity of the oeuvre (the structural failure of every single novel and
the separation of early and later works) undermines aesthetic value.
The rift thus introduced to the Faulkner oeuvre initiates a canonization
according to two alternative logics: on the one hand, the novels that
contribute to the mythical unity—that is, the Yoknapatawpha novels—
are great; on the other hand, the later novels no longer display the
initial artistic intensity that characterized the earlier works. This preliminary creation of the Faulkner canon, which is the foundation of the
critical consensus of the 1950s, is the necessary condition of Faulkner’s
canonization. In other words, while “Faulkner” as a unified entity could
not have been canonized at all, by the end of the fifties (somewhat
in the manner of covering up the traces of his very canonization) the
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already canonized Faulkner reclaims some of this lost unity. The third
step in the history of this critical reception, although based on the disunity of the oeuvre, consists of a unified celebration of “Faulkner” as the
greatest American novelist of the century which, potentially at least,
leans towards the elimination of the problem of the canon. The gradual
elimination of the canon, however, is not complete and the conflict
between Faulkner’s unqualified “greatness” and the rhetoric of periodization keeps haunting Faulkner criticism. During the third phase,
the issue of the Faulkner canon is removed from the center of critical
attention by two strategies: either by completely dismissing the problem of the question of value in an objective structural/formal analysis
(Vickery) and raising the problem of the complete intertextuality of the
oeuvre (Millgate), or by simply concentrating on the “great works” and
leaving the issue of the lesser works untheorized (Brooks).
Furthermore, as I would like to argue, it was precisely the abovedescribed contradiction at the heart of New Critical readings that provided the opening through which the next generation of scholars could
enter the stage of Faulkner criticism. This generation, whose theoretical
and political interests could no longer be contained within the confines
of the modernist consensus, did not fully emerge until the mid-seventies.8 As diverse as this group was, however, what bound them together
was a more or less explicit opposition to the terms of Faulkner’s modernist canonization. In a certain sense, their work was a reflection within
Faulkner studies of the general transformation of the American university as it came into contact with new (mostly French) theoretical
schools of thought. By the mid-eighties, however, in the wake of the
pioneering works of these scholars, a new critical consensus was in the
making. The interesting thing about this new consensus, however, was
that it recreated some of the conflicts at the heart of the modernist canonization: primarily, the tension between formalist and political readings of literature. As we have seen, the essence of the consensus between
New Critics and New York intellectuals was precisely a renegotiation
of formal and political aspects of literature. In the new theoretical climate, this opposition did not disappear without a trace. On the one
hand, certain “post-structuralist” readers of Faulkner (representatives
of what was eventually termed “New New Criticism”) continued and
redefined the formalist tradition by radicalizing its conclusions. On the
other hand, we also witnessed an increasing politicization of literature.
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This politicization, however, seemed to reach conflicting conclusions.
While some were busy reinventing Faulkner as a closet radical, others
did the exact opposite and attacked him for his avowed conservatism.
But what is important here is not so much the content of these political
judgments but their form: it is radicalism as political form that became
the object of investment. In other words, both Faulkner’s detractors
and supporters shared the essential belief of the postmodern consensus
that progressive radicalism represents political value. A new standard
of judgment emerged from the background of these debates: in order
to excite our postmodern sensibilities, Faulkner should have been both
aesthetically and politically a radical.
In order to explore in more detail the prehistory of this postmodern consensus, let us briefly compare a political and a formalist reading
of Faulkner from the late seventies: Myra Jehlen’s Class and Character
in Faulkner’s South (1976) and Gary Lee Stonum’s Faulkner’s Career:
An Internal Literary History (1979). What concerns us here the most
is the way the critique of the New Critical heritage is linked to the
periodized canon in these two books. In spite of their differences, what
is common to both Jehlen and Stonum is that they try to move beyond
the New Critical heritage by reconciling its constitutive contradiction.
Although later critics were quick to point out some of its shortcomings,
Myra Jehlen’s work has long been acknowledged as a pioneering political reading of Faulkner. To put it briefly, the crux of Jehlen’s argument is
to show that for Faulkner the class conflict between white planters and
farmers takes precedence over the problem of race and his ideological
ambivalence manifests itself on the level of form as well. In this regard,
Jehlen turns against formalist critics who want to separate language
from ideology and argues that for Faulkner “formal, linguistic problems
in defining the Yoknapatawpha universe are . . . inextricably ideological
as well” (42). According to Jehlen, Faulkner’s sympathies ultimately lie
with the white aristocracy of the South, and although he is capable of
sympathizing with the plight of poor white farmers and African Americans, he is ultimately unable to accept the logical conclusions his own
position. Discussing Go Down, Moses, she explains the limitations of
“Faulkner’s ideology” in the following terms: “For although he seems
to realize that the old racial ways can no loner work, he is unwilling to
abandon them or even to reconsider the racist assumptions which they
enacted” (121).
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A brief comparison with Cowley’s canonizing reading, however,
will explain a lot about Jehlen’s position. As we have seen above, even
for Jehlen the question of form and ideology appears on the level of the
“Yoknapatawpha universe.” For her, the primary terrain of the interaction of form and ideology is the constitution of character—a conclusion not all critics would necessarily accept. Thus, her claim is not that
Faulkner should not be reduced to a thematic unity but that this unity
is ideological. Therefore, like Cowley, Jehlen is also aware of the formal
shortcomings of Faulkner’s novels, but rather then overwriting them
by a thematic unity, she chooses to read them as signs of an ideological
ambivalence (22–23). Thus, by substituting “ideological ambivalence”
for “organic unity,” Jehlen can bypass the internal contradiction of New
Critical readings (the tension between organic unity and formal failure) as it is merely logical that ideological shortcomings should lead to
formal complications. But when it comes to an evaluation of the late
style, bypassing the New Critical contradiction through an ideological
detour ultimately amounts to the reaffirmation of the conclusions of
the New Critics. For example, this is how Jehlen speaks of Faulkner’s
“literary difficulties”:
These [literary difficulties] appear especially in the very uneven
Snopes trilogy . . . written relatively late in Faulkner’s career
and thus coinciding with a slight but artistically significant drift
to the political right. By this I refer, of course, not to a declared
shift from left to right . . . but to something more subtle having
to do with the way he interpreted his material and with the
degree of critical independence he maintained toward his subject. . . . This aspect of his political views is especially important because it contributed to the definition of his characters.
Faulkner’s class bias was thus directly involved in the formal,
most purely “artistic” aspects of his writing. (24–25)
In a certain sense, it is even easier for Jehlen to dismiss the late period
than it was for Cowley, since she can also rely on the political argument
according to which the late style is a reflection of an unwelcome political change. This is why it is important that Jehlen concurs with the
traditional canon that Absalom, Absalom! is “Faulkner’s best work, the
high point of his career” (55), even if it turned out to be a dead end. In
relation to this novel, the later works represent a regressive tendency as
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they deny its historical insights. Accordingly, the ideological attack on
Faulkner and his liberal critics (57–58) can make sense of a contradiction by supplementing it with a political argument, but it leaves the
canon itself untouched.
As opposed to Jehlen’s ideological reading, Gary Lee Stonum’s
primary objective is to reinvent the structure of Faulkner’s oeuvre and
move beyond the New Critical concept of “organic unity” by introducing the concept of “career.” Rather than postulating a total unity,
Stonum starts with the assumption of the contingent construction
of the oeuvre based on an essential disunity. This lack of unity, however, cannot be turned into the absolute negation of the coherence of
Faulkner’s literary output. As Stonum explains: “The coherence is no
simple unity; it cannot be grasped as a tidy linear unfolding, for example, or a process of steady, organic growth. Faulkner’s development is
not to be explained by a single, encompassing term for the cohesiveness
of all his writings nor even by a set of terms that would establish the
precise boundaries of his literary universe. Instead, it is a cumulative
process of change in which temporary unities are continually dissolved
and then reorganized as new work is produced” (14). Stonum’s relation
to the formalist heritage is made clearer when he identifies the two
schools against which he tries to define his own position. On the one
hand, he speaks of the “exegetical” interpretations of New Critics who
concentrate on individual works and authors (like Cleanth Brooks)
who attempt to grasp Faulkner as a “whole.” On the other hand, he distances himself from what he calls “theoretical poetics,” a category that
includes structuralist and post-structuralist critics who concentrate on
structure and discourse and thereby move towards determining forces
beyond the author’s personality. Stonum’s formalist compromise is to
strike a balance between the two (New Criticism and its post-Structuralist critique): “The study of literary career thus differs from poetics in
its assumption that the making of a career, rather than being a passive,
involuntary, or wittingly resigned implementation of what literature
allows, is a production more fully the writer’s own. It likewise differs
from exegetical criticism in not positing some autonomous, originating figure who directs the career with complete freedom” (26). Thus,
the new model that emerges from this critique of New Critical canon
formation is that of an “open system”: Faulkner’s literary career is simultaneously programmed and capable of re-programming itself.
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If the contradiction at the heart of Faulkner’s New Critical canonization was the tension between a hypostatized organic unity and the
effective reality of a disunited canon, we find that Stonum’s redefinition
of the structure of the oeuvre questions this “organic unity” but reaffirms
the periodized canon. The difficulty of Stonum’s enterprise is to maintain the coherence of the oeuvre without inventing yet another “single,
encompassing term for the cohesiveness of all [of Faulkner’s] writings.”
For Stonum does retain a master trope: “arrested motion.” While the
myth of Yoknapatawpha only provides continuity on the level of subject matter, according to Stonum, the concept of “arrested motion
implies specifications of method, form, theme, and purpose” (33). In
spite of Stonum’s professed goal to prove that “Faulkner is . . . not a
static essence but a process of transformation” (201), his choice to organize his readings in relation to a master trope (something that remains
the same through this process of transformation) necessarily results in a
return to the rhetoric of periodization. Since Stonum wants to show the
successive changes of the same principle, he ends up separating coherent units within the persistence of the same. The four phases—which
correspond to four different ways of “arresting motion” in art—are the
following: the first is Faulkner’s poetry and early fiction in thrall of pure
aesthetics; the second is “Faulkner’s first mature fiction”; the third is
the works of the late ’30s; and the last phase is the 1940s and 1950s. He
dates the beginning of the last phase with the appearance of The Hamlet
(1940) and considers the Snopes Trilogy to be its highest achievement.
Unlike the previous three, the last phase “attempts to comprise all of
what has gone before and, most importantly, to find a new level of organization for it rather than to dismantle the assumptions necessary to
Absalom, Absalom!” (154) As he simultaneously declares the failure of
A Fable (160) and celebrates the virtues of the Snopes trilogy, he effectively recreates the New Critical canon without its internal tension.
The critique of organic unity—in Stonum’s case at least—does not necessarily entail a critique of the canon.
On the basis of these two earlier examples, we can now briefly outline some of the defining characteristics of the postmodern consensus.
What I would like to show here is that most postmodern critics adopted
one of two alternative strategies in their re-canonization of Faulkner.
Some basically followed the path taken by Jehlen and Stonum and
tried to reconcile the internal contradiction of New Critical readings
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by interpreting this tension as the sign of the earlier critics’ inability
to cope with the postmodern impulse in Faulkner. Others, however,
chose the opposite path and, starting from similar assumptions, deliberately reversed the modernist canon. First of all, we have to note that
these readings (unlike the modernist consensus which tried to equate
formal innovation with moderate politics) represent an attempt to link
formal and political radicalism. The formalist postmodern strategy was
characterized by a tendency to discover in Faulkner’s novels a postmodernist impulse which was often interpreted as a radicalization of modernist aesthetics. The most influential formulation of this thesis is to be
found in Brian McHale’s Postmodernist Fiction which argued that Absalom, Absalom! represents a move beyond modernist aesthetics (10).9
Similarly, to quote a more recent example, Doreen Fowler considers
Absalom, Absalom! to be the “postmodern turn” in Faulkner’s oeuvre,
since in comparison with The Sound and the Fury it managed to reach
a higher level of self-reflexivity and thereby successfully deconstructed
patriarchy. According to Fowler, The Sound and the Fury “is demonstrably subversive in both form and content,” but there is “a crucial lapse in
the novel’s self-reflexivity” (97). In other words, the distance between
modernism and postmodernism is to be measured in degrees of subversion and self-reflexivity. This type of reading makes a full re-appropriation of the original Faulkner canon possible by locating the postmodern
at the heart of Faulkner’s modernism. In a certain sense, we witness here
yet another substitution similar to the ones performed by Jehlen and
Stonum. This time, however, “organic unity” is not replaced by “ideological ambivalence” or “arrested motion” but by the newly discovered
“postmodern turn” which provides a consistency to the canon that goes
beyond the failures of earlier formalist critics.
Instead of reinventing the major works, the other postmodern
strategy that I want to call attention to reinterprets the status of the
minor works by exploring the reasons why they fell outside the modernist consensus. In this regard, what makes Richard Moreland’s book,
Faulkner and Modernism (1990), an interesting case study is precisely
the fact that he rediscovers the “late works” as attempts to move beyond
Faulkner’s modernist failures. What was considered to be a failure of the
late style, namely repetition, is now reinterpreted as the very essence
of Faulkner’s art which therefore allows for a critical judgment of the
oeuvre. Putting aside the question of the validity of Moreland’s cri-
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tique of modernism, we can clearly observe that this attack still works
within the framework of the periodized canon only reconsiders the last
phase as the quasi-teleological move towards the next stage of literary
history (a nascent postmodernism) rather than a decline from triumphant modernism. The late period is no longer a retreat but a victorious
advance. In other words, one method of the postmodern canonization
was to recast the central division of the periodized canon in terms of the
modernist/postmodernist divide.
Faulkner’s redefinition as a postmodernist author was almost always
accompanied by a positive political judgment. André Bleikasten,
however, in a polemical piece directed against the “new ideologues”
of the late-eighties and the early-nineties, warned us that the move
beyond formalism is not without its own dangerous excesses. Bleikasten
rejected—in no equivocal terms—the tendency that turns Faulkner into
“a writer with strong political commitments on the left” (14) through
the revaluation of the late style. I will quote here one of Bleikasten’s primary targets, Joseph R. Urgo’s Faulkner’s Apocrypha (1989), to illustrate
this turn toward political and aesthetic radicalism through a revaluation of the late works: “The radicalism of his apocrypha has been muted
partially because of the personal image he cultivated in the 1950s, a
nonconfrontational, cordial, and rather self-indulgent style of Nobel
Laureate. His radicalism has been further muted by a specific reluctance
on the part of critics to address issues raised in his most ambitious projects” (4). I would like to juxtapose to this statement Noel Polk’s analysis of the modernist consensus, since he gave us an excellent description
of the way the domesticated political image of the late Faulkner was
projected upon the early Faulkner to save him from charges of nihilism,
while the image of this domesticated modernist was turned against the
later Faulkner to disqualify his artistic achievements (302–3). In other
words, we can trace here a symmetrical reversal of categories. The modernist consensus projected the politics of the late style onto the formal
innovations of the major period in order to disqualify the late works,
while the postmodern consensus evoked the image of “the radical postmodernist” through projecting the dynamics of earlier formal innovations onto the politics of the late style. In other terms, in the case of the
modernist Faulkner the political stance was formalized, since “radical”
formal innovation was given a moderate political content; while in the
case of the postmodern Faulkner, a formal aspect was politicized, since
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Faulkner’s deviation from modernist formal standards was given a progressive political content.10
The revaluation of the late period, however, proved to be a much
more difficult task than it had been first expected, and it is still at the
forefront of the critical debates today. For example, surveying the critical output of the Faulkner industry in 1999, Philip Cohen and Joseph R.
Urgo complained that “Faulkner studies continues to suffer from critical inattention to the later works, leaving some critics without a fully
informed understanding of his contributions to 20th-century literary
and intellectual history” (179). So, the question remains: What can
we conclude from the insight that the “late style” is not a consequence
but rather a condition of Faulkner’s canonization? First and foremost,
it becomes clear that contrary to the generally accepted narrative of
Faulkner’s canonization, it is not enough to say that the making of
Faulkner’s reputation was based on the consideration of his works as
a whole and the perception of a unity within this whole. Quite to the
contrary, the perception of the thematic unity was based on the identification of a lack of unity within the whole. The most effective way of
formalizing this disunity was the creation of the Faulkner canon. This is
why unity is the privilege of the canonized works only. To put it differently, while the critical invention of unity served the purpose of hiding
an essential lack of unity, the creation of the category of the late phase
made it possible to maintain this lack of unity although in a displaced
form as an issue of periodization.
So, when it comes to an evaluation of the late phase, a simple
reversal of categories (the elevation of the late phase over the major
period) or the complete abandonment of the discussion of internal differences in the oeuvre appear to be equally misguided. Rather, I would
insist that the “late style” is the first consensual critical name given to
the very condition (rather than the actual reason) of Faulkner’s canonization which is the lack of final unity of the cultural entity known as
“Faulkner.” If the late style names the condition of Faulkner’s canonization, it would be rather difficult to get rid of such a category altogether.
What we can do is articulate this condition, Faulkner’s internal difference, in ways different from the inherited category of the late style.
Such a rearticulation would imply that from the initial recognition that
Faulkner is not “one,” we do not automatically rush to the conclusion
that Faulkner is simply “two.” Before we get lost in a jubilant arithmetic
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of an infinite number of Faulkners, however, I want to point out that
the stake of such an inquiry is obviously not the discovery of the correct
number of Faulkners, but the confrontation with the self-evident point
that Faulkner is simply not “Faulkner.”
SUNY-Buffalo
notes
1. Another significant attempt to assess Faulkner’s reception can be found in
O. B. Emerson. I concentrate on Schwartz’s work because Emerson merely classifies
the different types of early Faulkner criticism, while Schwartz also tries to explain
the changes he identifies.
2. As an example of the first strategy I would refer to Fowler’s article which
argues that Absalom, Absalom! is essentially a postmodern work. For the second
strategy, which reinterprets the late style as a move beyond modernism, see Moreland.
3. For a collection of contemporary reviews and a list of further references, see
Inge’s selections. For an extensive description of this early reception, see Emerson.
4. See Skei’s article on the concept of “early Faulkner.” For discussions of the
“late style,” see for example Carothers’ and Millgate’s articles.
5. All of the early Faulkner commentators who made an assessment of the
whole oeuvre were of roughly the same opinion. My reading is based on books by
the following: Miner, Coughlan, O’Connor, Vickery, Slatoff, Hoffman, Howe, Millgate, Brooks, Swiggart, and Hoffman and Vickery. For a brief analysis of the early
anthologization of Faulkner’s work see Millgate’s “Defining Moment.” For recent
assessments of the concept of “career” in Faulkner criticism, see Skei’s, Wittenberg’s, and Zender’s articles in Faulkner at 100.
6. In more specific terms, Schwartz formulates this duplicity in the following
way: “What must be discovered, in other words, was a great literature rooted in
regional consciousness, but one that also transcended provincial nationalism to
achieve universality . . . . After the war, Faulkner would be read in terms of both the
traditionalism of Eliot, Tate, and the New Critics and the revolutionary modernism
of the New York intellectuals” (94).
7. Brooks himself is much closer to realizing Millgate’s ideal. The magnum
opus of the formalist response to Faulkner was, of course, Brooks’ Yoknapatawpha
Country from the same year as Millgate’s Achievement, and Brooks very explicitly
works with a concept of “major works” that can be clearly distinguished from the
minor ones.
8. Without trying to provide an exhaustive list, I will merely list some of the
major critics of this second wave of Faulkner criticism: Irwin, Bleikasten, Jehlen,
Kartiganer, Polk, and Matthews.
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9. This strategy was categorically rejected by Ihab Hassan.
10. Quite interestingly, Zender’s book seems to be outlining a new consensus.
In its preface, Zender describes himself as a product of the 1960s and expresses
his dissatisfaction with the postmodern Faulkner. Nevertheless, he admits that he
did learn certain things from postmodern scholars and proposes a critical position
that could interpreted as a compromise between the modernist and the postmodern
consensus: “The book acknowledges the need—indeed, the desirability—of politicizing the reading process and of decentering the canon, but it seeks to articulate
a middle-of-the-road alternative to the dominant postmodern approach to both of
these developments” (xiv).
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